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6 Reforming the Welfare State in 
Postsocialist Economies 
János Kornai
Harvard University and Collegium Budapest
When I was invited to participate in this series on transition, I was
not sure whether my proposed topic would really be appropriate.  In
this paper, I will primarily discuss welfare reform in postsocialist econ-
omies.  While welfare reform is part of transformation, I do not con-
sider it part of transition.  So let me begin by answering the questions
of when transition can be considered to be over in general and whether
it is over in Hungary specifically.  Then I will try to explain the role of
welfare reform in the transformation and go on to discuss welfare in
detail, with special attention to health care.
Each of us who works in the area has his or her own criteria for
determining the end of transition.  I have three such criteria, based on
the theory I applied in my book, The Socialist System (Kornai 1992).
When defining socialism, the starting point is not state ownership, cen-
tral planning, or the communist economy; it is the omnipotent rule of
the Communist Party.  So the first criterion is that the Communist Party
must lose its monopoly power in politics.  In that sense, transition in
China is definitely not over.  One cannot even speak of China as a tran-
sition economy because the Communist Party is still in power; rather,
China is a reforming communist country.  Note that the criterion is not
that the country be a democracy, only that the Communist Party not
hold a monopoly on political power.  The second criterion is that the
dominant part of the means of production must be held privately, and
the private sector must account for the larger part of gross domestic
product (GDP).  This private sector does not have to be created exclu-
sively through privatization: it can become dominant through the entry
of more and more new firms.  Third, the market must be the dominant
coordinator of economic activities, alongside various other mecha-
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nisms.  With these criteria, I aim at a minimum, not at an exhaustive,
list.
According to these criteria, the transition from the socialist to the
capitalist system in Hungary is basically finished.  This conclusion
does not mean that there are not any legacies of the former communist
system that still need to be transformed; it cannot be stated that every-
thing has been accomplished in all dimensions or that Hungary has a
perfect system.  There are still many institutions and organizations, as
well as attitudes, that must be changed.  So transformation is not over,
but transition is: the system is now a capitalist one.
Assar Lindbeck, in a recent paper on the Swedish welfare state,
refers to Sweden as a country in a mini-transition (Lindbeck 1998).  He
maintains that the scope as well as the size of the state should be
reduced, and most importantly, that the role of the state should be rede-
fined; this is similar to what needs to be done in Hungary.  In that
sense, one can say that, if Sweden is in transition, Hungary’s transition
is decidedly not complete, as the reform of the welfare state is still on
the agenda.  My view, however, is that the reform of the welfare state is
part of the ongoing transformation process and that there still are vari-
ous institutions in need of change in Hungary.  Welfare reform is part
of the transformation taking place in the postsocialist economies.  As
the problems in these economies are in some sense similar to those in
other countries, from Western Europe through North America to India
and China, my suggestions apply to many of the controversies occur-
ring wherever the need for reforming the welfare system is in the fore-
front of interest.
POINT OF DEPARTURE: PRINCIPLES
Reforming the welfare state is on the political agenda all over the
world.  For example, there is an ongoing debate over the social security
system in the United States.  The scope of this paper, however, is lim-
ited to the issue of reforming the welfare state in postcommunist coun-
tries; that is, the countries that before 1990 were dominated by the
Communist Party and operated according to the principles of the com-
munist system, and that are now going through the transformation pro-
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cess.  Hungary, my native country, is my main example, but many of
my observations and recommendations could be applied to other post-
communist countries as well.
Some clarification is needed in terminology.  The term welfare pro-
gram means something different in the United States than in many
other parts of the world, including Europe.  In the United States, wel-
fare means social assistance to a certain group of people, particularly
people in need.  I use the term welfare state in a much broader sense; it
includes state provision of old-age income (“social security” in U.S.
parlance),1 governmental participation in health provision, support for
families, children and mothers, the poor, and also the financing of edu-
cation.  All of these belong under the general term welfare state activi-
ties, on which this paper focuses in general.  In addition, specific
attention will be given to reform of the health sector.
A typical point of departure for discussions on welfare reform is
the financial soundness of the welfare sector.  For example, the first
argument when discussing social security in America is that the system
is not fiscally sustainable.  Other arguments are that the tax burden
related to the welfare state is too high and that the welfare sector is not
efficient and weakens the incentives for saving.  These are all economic
issues.  There are also political considerations.  What would the popu-
lation accept?  What is politically feasible?
Economic and political considerations are extremely important.
Nevertheless, reforming the welfare sector has a direct impact on peo-
ple’s lives: how citizens relate to the state, how one relates to fellow
citizens, and the nature of citizens’ responsibility for their own lives.
Here, one has to turn to political philosophy and ethics.  Such inquiry
is not common for economists, even for those who make policy recom-
mendations.
The usual approach is that economists develop propositions that
are consistent with economic principles, and then it is the politicians’
duty to implement these ideas.  Looking into the philosophical and
political ramifications of these propositions is regarded as the job of
philosophers and political scientists.  In response to that approach, I
would distinguish two situations: doing positive economic research
and thinking about normative questions in order to formulate policy
recommendations.  When observing the facts and drawing conclusions
and generalizations in order to explain various phenomena, ethical
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principles can be brushed aside.  I would say that 80 percent of my
research work has been in positive economics, and in these studies I do
not discuss my ethical convictions.
It is quite a different social role, however, if one steps out from the
position of an observer and analyst and takes on the responsibility of
submitting policy recommendations to the government or to the public.
In doing so, the ethical principles behind the suggestions cannot be
ignored.  There are two tactics economists apply to establish such prin-
ciples.  Many make some tacit or implicit ethical assumptions, leaving
them disguised or hidden, so that they are revealed only by careful
reading.  Others declare openly the ethical principles behind their rec-
ommendations.
I am in favor of the latter tactic.  There is certainly no consensus
about the selection of principles, but being explicit makes one think
about them.  In the case of some technical issues, one can be techno-
cratic and neutral, but I do not believe that you can make policy recom-
mendations on matters such as welfare state reform without adhering
to some basic ethical principles.
I will discuss three of the principles that underly my recommenda-
tions.2  Principle 1 is respect for individual sovereignty.  The individual
should be his or her own master and must have the right to choose;
however, these rights are coupled with an obligation to take responsi-
bility for one’s own life.  For an American, that seems an almost self-
evident principle, but it is much less trivial, for example, in a Scandina-
vian country, and even less so in a communist country.  The communist
system was characterized by a lack of respect for individual sover-
eignty and by strong limitations on choice; at the same time, the indi-
vidual was relieved of responsibility for his own life.  The state said,
“You just work and consume what we give you, and we will care for
you and tell you what to do.”  It was the paternalistic state in its
extreme, fully patronizing the individual.  Great respect of individual
sovereignty represents a radical departure from the ingrained beliefs
and attitudes that prevailed under the communist system.  The paternal-
istic features of the system should be reduced, as should the state’s
intervention in the life of the individual.
Principle 2 is the moral obligation of solidarity.  One has an ethical
duty to assist his or her fellow citizen if that individual is in trouble or
in need of help.  This idea can be illustrated by several aspects of wel-
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fare state activities, such as pensions or social assistance.  I will use the
health sector as an example.  The solidarity principle requires that one
cannot be indifferent to what is happening to the health of others.  One
cannot indifferently watch while another human being is suffering
because of an inability to pay for health services.
As an application of solidarity, I formulate a special principle for
the health sector, something like a corollary to Principle 2.  Equal
access to basic health care is a fundamental human right.  Two adjec-
tives require some comment.  One is “equal.”  I am not egalitarian in
my ethical value system: a strict and consistently egalitarian distribu-
tion of income and wealth would be incompatible with Principle 1, as it
contradicts the right to individual choice and individual autonomy.
However, health deserves special treatment because it is a matter of life
and death.  People can die if they do not get sufficient health care.
Nobel prize-winning economist James Tobin coined the term specific
egalitarianism regarding basic needs (Tobin 1970).  While rejecting
egalitarian principles in general, I am ready to accept specific egalitar-
ian principles concerning health.
The second important adjective in my corollary is “basic.”  I do not
suggest equal access to all health services; rather, I require only equal
access to basic health services.   I will elaborate upon this concept sub-
sequently, but at this point I only want to emphasize that the corollary
implies equal access for everyone to a minimum package.  
Principle 1 and Principle 2 are conflicting, and this conflict can be
very serious.  Therefore, the art of politics is to find an appropriate
compromise between these two principles.  To do that, certain proce-
dures and institutions are needed, leading to Principle 3, the commit-
ment to democracy and to the transparency of public decision-making
processes.  Here I will not take positions about whether the total
financing that goes to the health sector in, for example, Hungary or
Bulgaria or Russia is too much or too little.  My concern is not whether
health care is overfinanced or underfinanced, which is the main issue in
health controversies in Eastern Europe.  My question is, who has the
right to decide what is too much and what is too little, or more exactly,
what institutions and procedures should decide on the magnitude of
expenditures on health care.
The answer is not easy, because the players—such as the govern-
ment, the lawmakers, the doctors, various associations of doctors, cen-
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tralized insurance institutions, decentralized insurance companies,
hospitals, the patient, the taxpayer, trade unions, and employers’ asso-
ciations—have partly common, partly conflicting interests.  However,
establishing the right procedures and institutions enables the players to
decide both the revenues and expenditures of the health sector.  My
recommendation is to design or to let evolve institutions that will then
make these decisions.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
The initial conditions of reform are complex and I will discuss
only two.  In Eastern Europe and in the republics of the former Soviet
Union, there are universal entitlements.  These entitlements generally
apply to the welfare sector, and especially to health care.  A citizen is
entitled by the constitution to free medical service.  This entitlement is
built into his expectations, and his behavior is based on these expecta-
tions.  Thus, any reduction in the state’s responsibility is perceived as a
deprivation, a loss of acquired rights.  There are many legal problems
and constitutional compromises involved in the reform of such a sys-
tem.
The initial conditions for the reform differ from country to country,
so the reformer’s approach should vary as well.  In the United States,
for example, universal health care is not an acquired right.  Even China
has abandoned the system of universal entitlements.  In rural China,
where the majority of the Chinese population lives, state commitments
ceased with the collapse of the commune system, and health care has
been to a very large extent commercialized and turned over to the mar-
ket.  But for Eastern Europe, entitlements are still part of the law, and
most medical services are still provided free of charge.
Another condition that must be taken into account is a deep dissat-
isfaction of the population with health care.  People are not terribly
grateful for the fact that medical service is free because they take this
for granted, but they are very angry if the quality of medical service is
poor.  They compare it to the standards of countries like Austria, Ger-
many, or France.  Today, Eastern Europeans travel widely; they have
relatives in other countries, and so they have clear notions of the qual-
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ity of health service in Western Europe.  They find it unfair that living
in Hungary, or in Bulgaria or Romania, means that one does not get the
same health care that a German or a Belgian would get.
There is a rather clear relationship between GDP and the share of
health expenditure in GDP, and it is also established that this share
grows as GDP grows.  Richer nations spend a larger part of their GDP
on health.  One can draw a regression line based on data from countries
around the world to show this relationship and see that Hungary is
above the regression line (World Bank 1993).  In an earlier paper (Kor-
nai 1997a), I call Hungary a premature welfare state, because its
spending on welfare activities far exceeds what is justified by its level
of development.  In the 1980s, for example, Hungary was much less
advanced than the Scandinavian countries, but the Hungarian ratio of
welfare expenditures to GDP reached that of Scandinavia.
Nevertheless, Hungarians were and are dissatisfied.  They do not
accept the idea that Hungary’s GDP is smaller than that of more devel-
oped countries and that therefore health expenditures should be
smaller, too.  They feel, quite understandably, that a suffering Hungar-
ian deserves the same treatment as a suffering Austrian or German.  So,
while there is free allocation of health services, and total health spend-
ing is proportional to the resources, people are not happy.  This situa-
tion is partly due to the illusion that health care is free: individuals are
not aware of the fact that it is they, not the state, who pays for it.
What can be done under these circumstances?  In a recent book, I
outline my recommendations for reform of the health care system in
Hungary.3  I will present a few ideas from this proposal, which will be
organized in two sections.  First, I will discuss the demand side, that is,
the financing of the health sector; then I will turn to the supply side, the
delivery of health care.
THE FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE
First, let us consider the financing of the minimum basic package.
If we accept the principle that every citizen should have equal access to
basic health provision, the guarantor must be the state.  There are sev-
106 Kornai
eral possible institutional arrangements; I will consider two, which I
will designate A and B.
In arrangement A, the state determines by law a basic package of
health insurance that is mandatory (such as the required insurance for
automobiles, which can be exceeded by voluntary insurance).  Citizens
may buy this package in a decentralized insurance market.  They are
free to choose the insurance company, but they must buy the coverage.
If certain people are unable to afford it, the state steps in and pays their
mandatory insurance, in accord with the solidarity principle.  Those
who want to do so can buy additional health insurance, as is consistent
with the principle of individual sovereignty.  If one is ready to pay
more, he or she can buy better health service.  
In arrangement B, centralized financing for basic health service is
retained, resulting in a kind of national health service (sometimes
called a single-payer system) based on taxation.  Basic health care is
financed by the state budget.  This system does not exclude the provi-
sion of health service on a voluntary basis, which can be provided in a
decentralized fashion.  
Arrangement A allows for more freedom of choice and more
respect for sovereign decisions, while it ensures, through application of
the solidarity principle, equal access to all, including the poor.  It also
has certain disadvantages, such as higher transaction costs.  In addition
to these factors, the time sequence of reforms must be considered.
I recommend a two-phase reform process.  The first step should be
the introduction of arrangement B, because it builds on the initial con-
ditions.  That achieved, a gradual move to arrangement A, the more
decentralized approach, could follow, provided there is sufficient popu-
lar support for such a move.  The main reason for suggesting this incre-
mental strategy is that I oppose any suggestion that would create an
institutional vacuum.  Private insurance policies offered by insurance
companies, the institutional framework for decentralized private health
insurance, appropriate legal regulation, and well-functioning supervi-
sory authorities still do not exist in the field of health care.  One cannot
have trust in something one does not know.  Consequently, people do
not have confidence in private insurance.  Listening to a valid explana-
tion is not enough; what really changes people’s minds is practical
experience.
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An illustration is provided by pension reform in Hungary (an area
where the Hungarian transformation is greatly ahead of that of other
postsocialist countries).  The first, preparatory step was the introduc-
tion of voluntary pension schemes at the beginning of the 1990s to sup-
plement compulsory contributions paid into the central pension fund.
A host of privately managed, decentralized pension funds of all sizes
sprang up within a short while.  These made good use of investment
possibilities offered by the market, and their managers gained expertise
in financial operations.  Also, the funds operated under strict legal
supervision.  The first decentralized pension funds started to produce
handsome returns for members.  This evolution also provided some
practical experience for the population and created confidence.  Thus,
when the new, more radical multipillar pension system was introduced
in 1997, which shifted a significant part of compulsory contributions
into private, decentralized pension funds and insurance companies,
people knew what the privatization of the pension system was about.
A similar attitude is required when decentralizing health insurance:
rushing ahead may create serious troubles, as, for example, in the
Czech Republic (World Health Organization 1997).  There, some
insurance companies promised too much in order to lure people into
private plans and then refused to pay for certain medical activities; the
doctors went on strike because they did not get paid.  That is the reason
why I do not suggest an early deadline for reaching arrangement A.  I
recommend starting with arrangement B and progressing gradually.
Experience will tell when the time has come to introduce legislation to
allow a basic health care package to be bought from licensed health
insurance companies that have proved to be reliable.  The second phase
requires experience, appropriate legislation, regulatory mechanisms,
and an elaboration of the ways and means of assisting the needy.  Suc-
cess requires an evolutionary, gradualist approach in this context.
The next issue involves defining what I consider to be “basic.”  If
asked, a physician would say that any reasonable medical intervention
is basic.  As long as an additional dollar spent on health has positive
marginal utility, a doctor is inclined to call it basic.  Yet, there is no
country in the world, not even the richest, that could increase medical
expenditures to the level where the marginal utility of one additional
dollar is zero.  If tomorrow the United States were to spend three times
as much as it does now (13–14 percent of GDP), a doctor could still
108 Kornai
certainly propose one more activity, operation, screening, or preventa-
tive method that would contribute to the improvement of health.  It is
very difficult for doctors to acknowledge the facts of scarcity and ulti-
mate resource constraints.
Let us confine the discussion at this point to arrangement B, that is,
financing the provision of basic health care out of tax revenues.  There
are two genuinely effective constraints.  The first involves how much a
country can afford to spend on basic health care at its level of develop-
ment.  The second concerns how much the community is willing to pay
for this particular expenditure, that is, for the provision of basic health
care for all citizens.  This decision is not a medical one in the domain
of public finance.  It must go through the constitutional channel of
political decision making, and thus it should be determined by the leg-
islature.
Lawmakers, of course, need support from their constituencies.
They can get support in this case only if ordinary citizens have a better
understanding of the relationship between state spending and taxes.
Let me repeat that Hungarians think health care is free, and they find it
unsatisfactory.  They are not aware that they pay for it in many ways,
including taxes and various compulsory co-payments.  Dissatisfaction
makes them ask for greater health expenditures without understanding
that this commitment requires more revenues and thus higher taxes.
Their discontent is created by deception and is futile.  Consequently, I
advocate more transparency in financing matters.
There are several practical ways to make financing more transpar-
ent.  My example is Hungary, but some other Central and Eastern
European countries with similar institutional conditions have the same
problems.
1. In Europe—not only in Hungary but in many Western Euro-
pean countries—the term social insurance is often used.  In the
Hungarian case, I think this usage is wrong and deceiving.
What the employer and employee pay for the services pro-
vided by social insurance is far from being an insurance pre-
mium; it is first of all a redistributive tax.  In the case of a true
insurance policy bought and sold on the market, an equal pre-
mium is paid by the rich and the poor customer alike for the
identical policy sold by the same insurance company.  In con-
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trast, in the so-called social insurance programs, people with
higher incomes contribute more.
2. It is disturbing and confusing that the health tax, or contribu-
tion as it is now called, is split into two parts, one paid by the
employer and the other by the employee.  In fact, both parts are
components of the total wage bill, the total compensation for
work.  The situation would be different if employers could
choose from different levels of health contributions, including
the zero option.  In Hungary, however, the contribution paid by
employers is calculated according to uniform and mandatory
rates.  The system would be much more understandable, with-
out putting any additional tax burden on people, if salaries
were summed so as to include the employer’s contribution for
health insurance and then, out of this gross amount, the contri-
bution were deducted as a tax.  That would make it clear to
employees how much they pay for the health service.  Tax
withholding should be the responsibility of employers as part
of their managerial and accounting obligation.  The present
“employer’s contribution,” with the employer paying the
employee’s insurance, is deceptive.
3. The introduction of an earmarked health care tax would also
improve transparency.  Empirical observations show that peo-
ple are more willing to pay certain taxes if they know exactly
what the taxes are being collected for (Haynes and Florestano
1994).  As an advocate for specific egalitarianism, I call for a
redistributive tax for health care, but one that is designated for
this purpose.  I am certain that people would be more willing
to accept a tax that is spent on others’ health than on just any-
thing.  It is clear that this only means relabeling initially, but it
could help people—patient and doctor alike—to understand
that the health tax they pay must cover basic health service for
everyone.
4. Currently, the distribution of the tax burden is rather unfair.
Taxes collected from employees pay the larger part of the reve-
nues to the social insurance fund.  There are millions of free
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riders; in fact, one-third of the citizens pay two-thirds of total
contributions.  It would be desirable to broaden the tax base.
5. Introducing patient co-payments and issuing hospital bills
would serve to motivate patients to behave efficiently on the
demand side.  Currently, patients in Hungary leave the hospital
without knowing how much their treatment cost.  The doctors
and nurses do not know this cost either, nor does anyone else.
The bill should also state clearly the size of the patient’s direct
contribution and the amount paid out of the health tax.  People
would then know what they get for the tax they pay into the
health fund.  In general, more tax awareness and spending
awareness are needed.  The community of taxpayers should
know that, if they want more basic health services, they have to
pay more in health taxes and in co-payments.
6. Finally, a strict one-to-one correspondence should be estab-
lished between total expenditures for basic health service and
total revenues from health taxes and co-payments.  In other
words, the general budget should not be used to cover deficits
in the health fund.  In most Eastern European countries, the
health budgets, financed theoretically from the social insur-
ance contributions of citizens and operated by semiautono-
mous institutions, accumulate huge deficits year after year and
are bailed out almost automatically by the state budget.  The
central budget may provide temporary assistance by extending
a loan.  In the period of transition, which may last for several
years, assistance of some kind is decidedly necessary.  How-
ever, the ultimate goal should be to avoid accumulating a defi-
cit in the health budget. 
HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY
On the supply side, I am suggesting a gradual process of changing
ownership and control mechanisms.  Currently, the postsocialist coun-
tries have a provision system which, at least on the hospital and out-
patient clinic level, shows features of a market socialist regime.  State-
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owned hospitals in Hungary resemble state-owned enterprises under
Kádár in Hungary or under Gorbachev in the USSR.  They are still
highly dependent on the state, and there are hundreds of interventions
from the bureaucracy.  They also have soft budget constraints.  If a hos-
pital runs into debt, it is bailed out almost automatically; if not,
extremely strong pressure for a bailout arises.  In a Hungarian hospital
that exceeded its original budget by millions of forints, the doctors
went on a hunger strike to force the minister of finance to cover the
deficit; they succeeded.  A public hospital or outpatient clinic should
have a genuine, hard budget constraint.  It must be obliged to cover its
expenditures out of its revenues.
I would also welcome a law allowing the privatization of hospitals
and clinics in an evolutionary fashion, but I would advise against any
quick privatization campaign in the health sector.  Also, privatization
should not be a free gift (saying to someone, for example, “From now
on the hospital is yours”).
There can be various combinations of public and private entities
operating together.  Private companies or medical groups should be
allowed to take over the provision of various health services.  A public
hospital could lease out on a contractual basis certain activities, or pri-
vate medical groups could lease public hospital infrastructure.  The
main technique of privatization should be the sale of assets.  A hospital
or an outpatient clinic as a whole could be sold to a reliable buyer, pro-
vided the buyer offers appropriate guarantees to run the organization
according to the rules set by law.  The emergence of private provision
in the health sector should not be carried out by following a detailed
design; what needs to be done is to create the legal framework and the
supervisory agencies, and thus encourage the evolutionary develop-
ment of the private sector.
The health care system in the postsocialist countries will probably
never have a preponderance of private ownership.  Not even the United
States, which is regarded as having gone the furthest in encouraging
private health care provision, has an overly dominant private sector; a
very large number of U.S. hospitals are publicly owned.  One cannot
expect privatization to go as far on the supply side of the health sector
as it does in other areas of the economy.  However, there is no need to
assign proportions of private and public; the proportions will depend
on how things evolve.  
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CONCLUSIONS
In proposing reforms for the health care sector, I have tried to
strike a compromise between contradicting principles, by suggesting
an approach that offers more choice and more freedom for the individ-
ual and at the same time assures social solidarity.  Institutional arrange-
ments should share responsibility between the government and
citizens.  The decision rights should be split among three parties: the
legislature, determining the macrobudget of tax-based basic health pro-
vision; doctors involved in the micro-allocation; and households that
decide on spending above the mandatory tax.
I hope my suggestions will contribute to the discussion.  While
this—or any—proposal will not please everybody, there are good
chances that such reform can gain serious support.
NOTES
The text of this paper was transcribed directly from the author’s oral lecture; it there-
fore carries more of the characteristics of oral presentation.
1. In Europe, the term “social security” is what social policy aims to achieve; in the
United States, it means old-age income provided by the state.
2. This discussion is based on a paper in which I elaborate on nine principles (Kornai
1997b).
3. This book has so far been published only in Hungarian.
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